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Format: 2013-05-15
Format: 2013-05-15

Introduction: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Lifetime Achievement Award

Published in
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Peter J. Boettke | Jun 01, 2005
This introduction is taken from a special issue of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, “Polycentric Political Economy: A Festschrift for Elinor and Vincent Ostrom."

Methodological Individualism, Spontaneous Order and the Research Program of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis

Published in
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Christopher Coyne, Peter J. Boettke | Jun 01, 2005
This paper is an exercise in the archeology of knowledge that seeks to understand the intellectual precursors to the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. This perspective reveals that research agenda of the Ostroms draws significantly from the ideas and themes developed in the first half of the 20th century by Knight, Mises, and Hayek.

The Limits of Economic Expertise

Prophets, Engineers, and the State in the History of Development Economics
Published in
History of Political Economy
Peter J. Boettke, Steven Horwitz | Apr 18, 2005
What role is there for government in promoting the economic well-being of citizens within its national boundaries? If one assumes that political authority derives its legitimacy in part from the satisfaction it affords its subjects, then it follows that a "good" government will adopt policies that will enhance the economic well-being of its citizens.

Postwar Reconstruction

Some Insights from Public Choice and Institutional Economics
Published in
Constitutional Political Economy
Christopher Coyne, Tyler Cowen | Feb 01, 2005
This paper analyzes the array of relationships that take place in the reconstruction process – political, economic and social – by considering under what circumstances they are situations of conflict or coordination. Historical attempts at reconstruction provide further understanding of how to achieve success.

Self-Enforcing Arrangements in African Political Economy

Published in
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Peter Leeson | Jun 01, 2005
Self-enforcing arrangements are crucial to the study of African political economy. The weakness of formal governance in much of Africa makes understanding informal institutions of cooperation particularly important. I consider the application of self-enforcing arrangements, like those described by the Ostroms, to the problems of violence and social heterogeneity that plague Africa.

Knowledge, Economics, and Coordination

Understanding Hayek's Legal Theory
Published in
NYU Journal of Law and Liberty
Christopher Coyne, Peter J. Boettke, Scott Beaulier | Jan 01, 2005
Legal scholars and economists alike have been quite critical of F.A. Hayek’s legal theory. According to Richard Posner, Hayek’s legal theory is “formalist” and serves as a useless guide for legal and judges. We argue that these criticisms are misplaced, and we contend that Hayek’s legal theory cannot be separated from his economic theory. To establish this point, we trace the evolution of Hayek’s thought from his earlier writings in technical economics to his later writings on legal theory.

Look Botswana: No Hands! Why Botswana's Government Should Let The Economy Steer Itself

Scott Beaulier | Mar 2005
This working paper is a study of how the institutional levers of government affect economic activity. The underlying logic is that changes in the "rules of the game" can affect economic outcomes.

The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Botswana - Working Paper

Scott Beaulier, Robert Subrick | Feb 2004
This working paper explores the political foundations of economic growth in Botswana. In particular, we apply the theory of the proprietary states to economic development (Grossman and Noh 1990,…

Hayek Memorial Lecture

Peter J. Boettke | Oct 27, 2004
Is there a unique Austrian School of Economics that represents a viable research program in modern economics? Peter Boettke locates the intellectual position and opportunities for mutually beneficial…

Efficient Anarchy

Published in
Public Choice
Peter Leeson | Apr 02, 2007
Can anarchy be efficient? This paper argues that for reasons of efficiency, rational, wealth-maximizing agents may actually choose statelessness over government in some cases.