A successful president, e.g., one who can be reelected or help to pave the way for the party in the next election, must find ways to steer bureau activities in his preferred direction while delivering on regulatory promises made in the process of being elected. Our review of all empirical work on White House review as well as our own institutional and statistical findings yield strong support to the notion that the review process provides opportunities to make presidential preferences operational.
This paper examines the American post-WW1 boom and bust. It argues that the Federal Reserve’s monetary easing from 1919 to 1920 created an Austrian Business Cycle (ABC), or an unsustainable credit boom. The collapse of the boom initiated the Depression of 1920–1921.
Any managed migration system will fail to achieve the optimal quantity or mix of immigrants because centrally planning the international labor market suffers from the same epistemic problems that make it impossible to optimally plan any market.
The U.S. welfare state is rushing toward a fiscal cliff. Without a dramatic cut in government spending or a steep increase in taxes, the nation’s massive indebtedness will spark a fiscal crisis likely to force citizens and politicians to reassess the government’s role in the economy and to consider free-market, civil-society-based alternatives.
Self-defeating moral views and creativity-sapping state control give us reason to be pessimistic about the future, but the ingenuity of entrepreneurs and the market makes us optimistic. These opposing forces will shape the institutions that determine the course of our economic future.
Federal deposit insurance creates moral hazard that encourages risky banking practices and sets the stage for bank failures and financial crises. Alternatives to our current scheme include the creation of a more stable, privatized deposit insurance system, and the strengthening of market discipline through the lowering of mandated coverage levels, or doing away with deposit insurance requirements altogether.
This paper is an attempt to contribute to the microfoundations debate by discussing the distinctive methodological characteristics of the Austrian school, and how they relate to different conceptions of equilibrium and general equilibrium models.
Mercatus PhD Fellow Vipin Veetil, along with Akshaya Vijayalakshmi and Srikanth Viswanathan, address Amartya Sen's criticism of cash-transfer programs such as education vouchers in the Wall Street Journal.
This study represents a serious challenge to conventional thinking in contemporary comparative systems, and the economics of socialism. It disputes the commonly accepted view of both the nature of the 'socialist calculation debate' of the 1930s and the lessons to be derived from it.