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Christopher Coyne

Christopher Coyne

  • Associate Director of the F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the Mercatus Center
  • F.A. Harper Professor of Economics at the Mercatus Center
  • Professor of Economics at George Mason University

Christopher Coyne is Associate Director of the F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. He also holds the title of F.A. Harper Professor of Economics at the Mercatus Center and he is a member of the department of economics at George Mason University where he serves as the Director of Graduate Studies. He is also the North American Editor of The Review of Austrian Economics and the Book Review Editor of Public Choice. Dr. Coyne is a member of the Board of Scholars for the Virginia Institute for Public Policy and was named the Hayek Fellow at the London School of Economics in 2008. He is the author of After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy (2007, Stanford University Press), Media, Development and Institutional Change (co-authored with Peter Leeson, 2009, Edward Elgar Publishing), Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Action Fails (2013, Stanford University Press), and the co-editor (with Rachel Mathers) of The Handbook on the Political Economy of War (2011, Edward Elgar Publishing).  In addition, he has authored numerous academic articles, book chapters, and policy studies. He received his Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University.

Published Research

Peter J. Boettke, Christopher Coyne, Abigail Hall | May 2013
This Article examines the political economy of the War on Drugs with particular emphasis on the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. This Article analyzes the effects of prohibition on violence, drug potency, and cartelization in the drug market.
Christopher Coyne, Abigail Hall | Mar 2013
The ongoing “wars” on drugs and terrorism have helped to militarize domestic policing, giving us “no-knock” raids and other tactics formerly considered off-limits for civilian law enforcement. A political-economic analysis of this trend explains how crises have eroded rules that were created to constrain the use of military power and separate domestic policing from military functions.
Christopher Coyne | Mar 2013
Given the hostility toward capitalism, what is the advocate of free markets to do? This question provides the focus for Enrico Colombatto’s Markets, Morals and Policy-Making.
Christopher Coyne, Abigail Hall | Feb 09, 2013
Recent scholarship regarding the idea of a U.S. Empire has raised serious questions as to the feasibility and desirability of imperial ambitions. This paper traces the debate over the net-benefit of empire back to the Classical economists. Adam Smith argued that the British Empire was a net cost while John Stuart Mill concluded the same empire was a net benefit.

Working Papers

Christopher Coyne, Thomas Duncan | Mar 19, 2013
The narrative that arose during the Great Depression and World War II was that capitalism was in its final stages and failing. The economic arguments of the time combined strands of Keynesianism and Marxism to construct a link between military spending and unemployment, suggesting that the capitalist economy of the U.S. must become militarized to be sustained.
Christopher Coyne, Abigail Hall | Feb 09, 2013
Recent scholarship regarding the idea of a U.S. Empire has raised serious questions as to the feasibility and desirability of imperial ambitions. This paper traces the debate over the net-benefit of empire back to the Classical economists.
Christopher Coyne, Abigail Hall | Dec 11, 2012
Institutional bottlenecks refer to path-dependent institutional arrangements which contribute to economic stagnation. In his research, Timur Kuran identifies several historical institutional bottlenecks which contributed to economic decline and underdevelopment of the Middle East. The authors use Kuran’s research as springboard to ask: what can be done about institutional bottlenecks?
Christopher Coyne, Rachel Mathers | Aug 25, 2012
This paper develops the political economy of human rights scandals involving government agencies. An analysis of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal is provided to illustrate the economic approach to human rights scandals.